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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, a cor-
poration as Trustee, and PRUDEN-
TIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, a Corporation 
Plaintiffs and Respondants 
vs. 
PAYLESS BUILDERS SUPPLY, a Utah 
Corporation, ELLIS J. ROBINSON 
and ELIZA S. ROBINSON 
Defendants and Appellants 
and 
MOUNT OLYMPUS COVE, BREIT-
LING BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, SECURITY TITLE CO., 
WILLIAM R. WALLACE, UTAH 
SAND & GRAVEL PRODUCTS COR-
PORATION, MAX G. FRAMPTOM, 
MURRAY STATE BANK, R. W. 
FRANK&CO. 
Defendants and Respondants 
CASE 
No. 10269 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The case in an action brought by the plaintiffs 
against the defendants to foreclose a trust deed as a 
mortgage on real propertly situate in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, described as: 
All of Lot 15, Mount Olympus Cove, according to the 
plat thereof recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the time of the pre-trial hearing on September 
10, 1964, and without prior written notice, the plaintiff's 
attorney, as the record of the pre-trial proceedings dis-
closes, moved the pre-trial judge for entry of summary 
judgment, which over the objection of the appellant's 
attorney was granted. Findings and conclusions together 
with a decree of foreclosure were prepared and entered, 
and the property was sold to satisfy the debt. There are 
two returns of the sheriff in the file, the latter apparently 
purporting to supersede the former. The latter return 
evidences a deficiency both in favor of the plaintiff and 
in favor of Mount Olympus Cove. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the decree, findings 
and conclusions, together with the sheriff's sale vacated 
and the case remanded for the trial of the issues of fact 
and law presented by the pleadings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only record upon which we rely consists of 
the pleadings and the pre-trial order. There exists in the 
file a document entitled "findings of fact and conclusions 
of law", but the record does not appear to contain either 
discovery proceedings or any evidence except on the 
question of attorney's fees, upon which said findings, 
conclusions, and decree can be based. A recitation of facts 
in this brief would then be tantamount to testifying, a 
procedure not within the contemplation of the rules 
pertaining to appellate practice. The undisputed facts 
however disclose that Payless Builders Supply acquired 
--
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a lot from Mount Olympus Cove for the purpose of build-
ing a home, and that out of the transaction with Mount 
Olympus Cove, a certain indebtedness arose. The details 
of the same are not entirely know except through in-
formal discussion with counsel. The exhibits reflected 
on page 74 of the record were "admitted in evidence" 
but are not longer in the file. They were apparently 
withdrawn by the attorneys who brought them to court. 
The appellants do not dispute the fact that Payless 
Builders Supply borrowed some money from Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association with which to 
construct a building on the subject property. While 
the partially legible exhibits to the plaintiff's complaint 
disclose some of the details of the transaction, all of 
the facts with respect thereto are also not know, 
particularly those relating to the dates and amounts of 
the interim partial disbursements of the loan proceeds, 
the accruing interest on the disbursements, credits for 
payments made thereupon and for rents received from 
the tenant in possession during the pendency of the 
action. The appellants allege affirmatively, although 
there is no competent evidence in the record respecting 
the same, that there is now, and that there has been 
for a considerable length of time, a party in possession 
of the premises, whose identity is not know and who 
has not been placed there by the appellants. It is believed 
that the party in possession is there with the permission 
of the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG-
MENT WAS GRANTED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE 
4 
TEN DAYS NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The principles governing motions made in trial 
courts and elsewhere are set forth in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. All motions except those made during 
a trial must be made a writing and argument made upon 
notice prescribed by these rules. With respect to summary 
judgments, the party against whom the relief is sought 
is entitled to ten days written notice, exanded to thirteen 
if the notice is served by mail. Applicable rules are set 
forth in Rule 6 ( e) and Rule 56 ( c) which provide that the 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time 
fixed for hearing unless the same is mailed in which 
case three days is to be added to the prescribed time. 
The record of the pre-trial proceedings disclose the 
following: 
"At the time of the pre-trial, the plaintiff's coun-
sel, Earl P. Staten made a motion for summary 
judgement which court granted." 
POINT II 
EVEN WITH PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT 
WOULD HAVE ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION WITH THE PLEADINGS REFLECTING THE 
VARIOUS UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT IN-
VOLVED. 
Summary Judgment will only lie in cases where 
there are no issues of fact and where the trial court can 
dispose of the disputes and contentions as a matter of 
law. Governing principles are set forth in rule 56. The 
important language is in paragraph ( c) which authorizes 
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entry of judgment when there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and when the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. In determining this 
issue, one cannot go outside of the pleadings to speculate 
what the evidence might be. It is not argued that the facts 
would be hard for the plaintiff to prove in order to obtain 
some sort of relief. It is simply an issue of whether the 
pleadings, in their present from, indicate that there are 
facts that are neither proven nor admitted, placing them 
at issue and putting the burden on theplaintiff of either 
establishing them by discovery or by competent evidence. 
Courts, in ruling on motions for summary judgment 
are confronted with finding whether there are any issues, 
not trying to resolve them. If the pleadings raise issues 
of fact, the only proper action that may be taken is set the 
matter down for trial. No authorities are citied on this 
point because the rule seems to be well established. The 
cases simply reaffirm that the rule means what it says. 
If issues of fact are present in the pleadings, the motion 
for summary judgment must be denied. 
It should be observed that no interrogatories or re-
quests for admissions were served. Neither were any 
depositions taken. The only record that exists is the 
aggregation of the various complaints, counter-claims, 
cross-complaints and the various answers thereto, to-
gether with the pre-trial order and the findings, con-
clusions, and decree. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS HA VE FAILED TO PROVE BY 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE MATERIAL ELE-
MENTS OF THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION. 
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The record discloses that certain exhibits, namely 
notes and mortgages, were "Admitted in Evidence." The 
transcript does not disclose how. There is not one word 
about offering or tendering them into evidence. While it 
is possible that the reporter did not take down this part 
of the proceedings, it is difficult to have an opinion 
on this question at this late date. The record is silent 
and it is not know whether the exhibits were or were 
not authenicated, were or were not offered, and were 
or were not withdrawn. There are signatures of counsel 
on the exhibit sheet evidencing the fact that if the same 
were admitted in evidence, the same have been with-
drawn by counsel. 
POINT IV 
THE PLAINTIFFS HA VE FAILED TO FOLLOW 
THE STATUTORY REMEDY PROVIDED FOR THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LIQUIDATION OF TRUST DEEDS. 
If the plaintiffs have an evidence of indebtedness, 
it is at best a Trust Deed. The security of a trust deed 
is to be liquidated in accordance with the provisions of 
title 57, chapter 1, begining with paragraph 19 and ending 
with paragraph 36 of the Utah Code, Annotated, 1953. 
Admittedly in paragraph 23 of this title the plaintiff 
is given the option to foreclose a trust deed like a 
mortgage, but there is no record to indicate how and 
when that option was exercised prior to filing the com-
plaint, and if so, how the notice of that option was made 
know to the appellants. 
-
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POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COSTS 
' EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN EXCESS OF 
THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH BY STATUE. 
The measure of the allowable costs, expenses, and 
attorneys fees, in the aggregate, is set forth in Title 57, 
Chapter 1, paragraph 31 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. This statute provides in part that the owner or 
party in default may pay at any time prior to the time 
the power of sale is exercised, or the decree of fore-
closure is entered, the amount then due under the terms 
of the trust deed (presumably the delinquent install-
ments) plus ..... . 
Costs and Expenses actually incurred in enforcing 
the terms of such obligation or trust deed, and the 
trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not 
exceeding in the aggregate fifty dollars or one 
half of one percent of the entire unpaid principal 
sum secured, whichever is greater." 
The necessary implication is that if the same is not 
paid before entry of decree of foreclosure that the de-
faulting party will lose the right to reinstate the oblig-
ation by bringing current the past-due payments. It does 
not imply however, that the obligee has a claim to more 
than one half of one percent to pay the aggregate· costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees. This would limit the re-
covery of the plaintiff to its principal, accruing interest, 
and $137.00 in costs and fees. If the court sees fit to vacate 
the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter 
for trial, the appellants will once again have the privilege 
8 
of reinstating the trust deed by paying all delinquent 
installments (if there are any) and 1/2 of 1 % of $27,500.00, 
minus whatever rents the plaintiff has collected on the 
premises. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW THE 
DEFENDANT A JURY TRIAL 
The right to a jury trial in civil disputes involving 
question of fact in an action at law is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, by Statute, and by cases construing the 
same. It is respectfully submitted that this case falls 
within the preview of that protection. 
POINT VII 
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY IS NOT A PROPER 
PARTY PLAINTIFF 
Under the assumption that the evidences of indebted-
ness create a lien in the property to secure the payment 
of the debt, the owner of the lien is the proper party 
plaintiff in a foreclosure action. Under a trust deed, the 
beneificary, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan, and 
not Security Title Company would be the owner and 
holder of the lien, making Prudential Federal a proper 
party plaintiff, but not Security Title Company. It is 
interesting to note that Security Title Company is both 
a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action. 
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POINT VIII 
ELLIS J. ROBINSON AND ELIZA ANN ROBIN-
SON ARE AT MOST ACCOMODATION MAKERS WHO 
ARE RELEASED FROM LIABILITY IF THE PLAIN-
TIFFS HAVE GRANTED EXTENSIONS AND IN-
DULGENCES TO THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR, PAY-
LESS BUILDERS SUPPLY. 
This issue of law, whether valid or not, would depend 
upon the evidence to be adduced at a trial. It would have 
to be proven that they were in fact accomodation makers 
and that indulgences and extensions were granted. They 
may not succeed in proving this point, but they should 
not be denied the opportunity by the employment of 
summary proceedings where such proceedings do not 
correctly lie. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that in the above caption-
ed matter the judgment of the trial court should be va-
cated and the matter remanded to the district court for 
a determination of the facts in dispute. In connection 
therewith the sheriff's sale should be aside and vacated. 
' 
Respectfully Submitted, 
John El wood Dennett 
Attorney for Appellants 
1243 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
